A phalanstery in the abyss
António Cerveira Pinto
I started "O
Grande Estuário" (The Great Estuary) in 2004, in
close
cooperation with the architect Carlos Sant'Ana. The first results
were
shown on 15 January 2005. On 29 April of the same year, and in
the same
art gallery, the Quadrum, a set of ideas and proposals were put
forward
for Lisbon after the oil era, with a time horizon of the year
2020. To
transform the Lisbon and Tagus valley region into an eco-technological
sanctuary and Lisbon into a major bio-city extending along both
banks of
the estuary; to expand the centre of Lisbon to the south bank
of the
river; to promote the candidature of the greater metropolitan
area for the
2020 Olympic Games; to prepare the region for the decay and abandonment
of
the urban suburbs over the next 20-30 years; and finally, to
restore the
green belts attacked by the industrial and suburban devastation
of the
past 50 years, have been, until now, the main points of application
of a
strategy that has the objective of forecasting how this major
urban
settlement can survive in the extremely adverse context of the
accelerated
ending of the world's oil and natural gas reserves.
In the context of
this presentation it is relevant to cite the report of
Robert L. Hirsch, Roger Bezdek and Robert Wending, "Peaking
of World Oil
Production: Impacts, Mitigation, & Risk Management",
February 2005,
commissioned by the National Energy Technology Laboratory, a
U.S.
Department of Energy body. The coordinator of this study was
in Lisbon
last May at the International Workshop on Oil and Gas Depletion,
promoted
by A.S.P.O., where he presented some of the conclusions of the
much
anticipated Hirsch Report. It was strange to note that, as has
happened in
the United States where the media have ostracised the Hirsch
Report, the
workshop received scant attention from the Portuguese media.
The forecast
given in this report on the catastrophic effects of the energy
crisis on
the global economy and security which it is believed will occur
no later
than 2025, coincides, although only with regard to fossil fuels,
with what
is contained in the forecast tables of the "Limits to Growth
(The 30-Year
Update)", by Donella Meadows, Jorgen Randers and Dennis
Meadows. Human
civilisation may well have already entered full "overshoot"
mode.
The introduction of
the Hirsch Report is worth reading:
"The peaking
of world oil production presents the U.S. and the world with
an unprecedented risk management problem. As peaking is approached,
liquid
fuel prices and price volatility will increase dramatically,
and, without
timely mitigation, the economic, social, and political costs
will be
unprecedented. Viable mitigation options exist on both the supply
and
demand sides, but to have substantial impact, they must be initiated
more
than a decade in advance of peaking.
In 2003, the world
consumed just under 80 million barrels per day (MM bpd)
of oil. U.S. consumption was almost 20 MM bpd, two-thirds of
which was in
the transportation sector. The U.S. has a fleet of about 210
million
automobiles and light trucks (vans, pick-ups, and SUVs). The
average age
of U.S. automobiles is nine years. Under normal conditions, replacement
of
only half the automobile fleet will require 10-15 years. The
average age
of light trucks is seven years.
Under normal conditions,
replacement of one-half of the stock of light
trucks will require 9-14 years. While significant improvements
in fuel
efficiency are possible in automobiles and light trucks, any
affordable
approach to upgrading will be inherently time-consuming, requiring
more
than a decade to achieve significant overall fuel efficiency
improvement.
Besides further
oil exploration, there are commercial options for
increasing world oil supply and for the production of substitute
liquid
fuels: 1) Improved Oil Recovery (IOR) can marginally increase
production
from existing reservoirs; one of the largest of the IOR opportunities
is
Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), which can help moderate oil production
declines from reservoirs that are past their peak production:
2) Heavy oil
/ oil sands represents a large resource of lower grade oils,
now primarily
produced in Canada and Venezuela; those resources are capable
of
significant production increases;. 3) Coal liquefaction is a
well
established technique for producing clean substitute fuels from
the
world's abundant coal reserves; and finally, 4) Clean substitute
fuels can
be produced from remotely located natural gas, but exploitation
must
compete with the world's growing demand for liquefied natural
gas.
However, world-scale contributions from these options will require
10-20
years of accelerated effort.
Dealing with world
oil production peaking will be extremely complex,
involve literally trillions of dollars and require many years
of intense
effort. To explore these complexities, three alternative mitigation
scenarios were analyzed:
Scenario I assumed
that action is not initiated until peaking occurs.
Scenario II assumed
that action is initiated 10 years before peaking.
Scenario III assumed
action is initiated 20 years before peaking.
For this analysis
estimates of the possible contributions of each
mitigation option were developed, based on an assumed crash program
rate
of implementation.
Our approach was
simplified in order to provide transparency and promote
understanding. Our estimates are approximate, but the mitigation
envelope
that results is believed to be directionally indicative of the
realities
of such an enormous undertaking. The inescapable conclusion is
that more
than a decade will be required for the collective contributions
to produce
results that significantly impact world supply and demand for
liquid
fuels.
Important observations
and conclusions from this study are as follows:
1. When world oil
peaking will occur is not known with certainty. A
fundamental problem in predicting oil peaking is the poor quality
of and
possible political biases in world oil reserves data. Some experts
believe
peaking may occur soon. This study indicates that "soon"
is within 20
years.
2. The problems
associated with world oil production peaking will not be
temporary, and past "energy crisis" experience will
provide relatively
little guidance. The challenge of oil peaking deserves immediate,
serious
attention, if risks are to be fully understood and mitigation
begun on a
timely basis.
3. Oil peaking
will create a severe liquid fuels problem for the
transportation sector, not an "energy crisis" in the
usual sense that term
has been used.
4. Peaking will
result in dramatically higher oil prices, which will cause
protracted economic hardship in the United States and the world.
However,
the problems are not insoluble. Timely, aggressive mitigation
initiatives
addressing both the supply and the demand sides of the issue
will be
required.
5. In the developed
nations, the problems will be especially serious. In
the developing nations peaking problems have the potential to
be much
worse.
6. Mitigation will
require a minimum of a decade of intense, expensive
effort, because the scale of liquid fuels mitigation is inherently
extremely large.
7. While greater
end-use efficiency is essential, increased efficiency
alone will be neither sufficient nor timely enough to solve the
problem.
Production of large amounts of substitute liquid fuels will be
required. A
number of commercial or near-commercial substitute fuel production
technologies are currently available for deployment, so the production
of
vast amounts of substitute liquid fuels is feasible with existing
technology.
8. Intervention
by governments will be required, because the economic and
social implications of oil peaking would otherwise be chaotic.
The
experiences of the 1970s and 1980s offer important guides as
to government
actions that are desirable and those that are undesirable, but
the process
will not be easy.
Mitigating the
peaking of world conventional oil production presents a
classic risk management problem:
Mitigation initiated
earlier than required may turn out to be premature,
if peaking is long delayed.
If peaking is imminent,
failure to initiate timely mitigation could be
extremely damaging.
Prudent risk management
requires the planning and implementation of
mitigation well before peaking. Early mitigation will almost
certainly be
less expensive than delayed mitigation. A unique aspect of the
world oil
peaking problem is that its timing is uncertain, because of inadequate
and
potentially biased reserves data from elsewhere around the world.
In
addition, the onset of peaking may be obscured by the volatile
nature of
oil prices. Since the potential economic impact of peaking is
immense and
the uncertainties relating to all facets of the problem are large,
detailed quantitative studies to address the uncertainties and
to explore
mitigation strategies are a critical need.
The purpose of
this analysis was to identify the critical issues
surrounding the occurrence and mitigation of world oil production
peaking.
We simplified many of the complexities in an effort to provide
a
transparent analysis. Nevertheless, our study is neither simple
nor brief.
We recognize that when oil prices escalate dramatically, there
will be
demand and economic impacts that will alter our simplified assumptions.
Consideration of those feedbacks will be a daunting task but
one that
should be undertaken.
Our study required
that we make a number of assumptions and estimates. We
well recognize that in-depth analyses may yield different numbers.
Nevertheless, this analysis clearly demonstrates that the key
to
mitigation of world oil production peaking will be the construction
a
large number of substitute fuel production facilities, coupled
to
significant increases in transportation fuel efficiency. The
time required
to mitigate world oil production peaking is measured on a decade
time-scale. Related production facility size is large and capital
intensive. How and when governments decide to address these challenges
is
yet to be determined.
Our focus on existing
commercial and near-commercial mitigation
technologies illustrates that a number of technologies are currently
ready
for immediate and extensive implementation. Our analysis was
not meant to
be limiting. We believe that future research will provide additional
mitigation options, some possibly superior to those we considered.
Indeed,
it would be appropriate to greatly accelerate public and private
oil
peaking mitigation research. However, the reader must recognize
that doing
the research required to bring new technologies to commercial
readiness
takes time under the best of circumstances. Thereafter, more
than a decade
of intense implementation will be required for world scale impact,
because
of the inherently large scale of world oil consumption.
In summary, the
problem of the peaking of world conventional oil
production is unlike any yet faced by modern industrial society.
The
challenges and uncertainties need to be much better understood.
Technologies exist to mitigate the problem. Timely, aggressive
risk
management will be essential."
in http://oge.risco.pt/ftp/Oil_Peaking_NETL.pdf
We will see in the
course of 2006-07 whether the volatility of the energy
markets, the probable bursting of the world property bubble,
the number of
natural catastrophes and pandemics, hunger and new and more surprising
military conflicts (of which the nuclear tension in Iran is a
terrible
warning) will prove that these disturbing scenarios are, unfortunately,
correct. If I was the prime minister of Portugal I would look
at these
warnings with great concern and obtain the support of the next
president
of the republic for the alliance necessary to impose a real emergency
plan
in the areas of energy, transport, land use planning, agriculture
and
fisheries, internal security and national defence … Everything
else will
follow, in support of these priorities.
The outlook could
not be more depressing. But we owe it to Donella Meadows
(a pioneer in identifying this problem) to make the effort to
confront
this uncertain future with a positive strategy. According to
the co-author
of "Limits to Growth" (1972, 2004) and of "Beyond
The Limits" (1992), we
need to make a new revolution, the Sustainability Revolution.
And to do
this, there is nothing better than following some standards for
strategic
behaviour: Visioning, Networking, Truth-Telling, Learning and
Loving. If
we are able to pass on this message and apply it now to the territory
we
inhabit and in which we live and work, we will be doing ourselves
a good
service and helping to implement the urgently needed Sustainability
Revolution. In Lisbon, this revolution goes by the name of "O
Grande
Estuário" (The Great Estuary)!
To support the idea
of this forced march against chaos, I thought up a
symbolic image: building a phalanstery in the abyss. All that
was needed
now was an icon to represent this. And it was just at this point
that
Emanuel Dimas de Melo Pimenta and his architectonic-musical
proto-structures entered the scene, fundamentally and very opportunely
linked to the aesthetic utopias of Richard Buckminster Fuller
and John
Cage.
Bucky Fuller's avant
la lettre generative and biological architecture
makes a lot of sense at this stage of "O Grande Estuário"
in so far as we
should avoid some of the traps of pragmatism but also since we
need to
find a system of generative modules that allow our more or less
aprioristic intellectual schemes to be born and take on biocybernetic
form. It would make sense to find a speculative counterpoint
in the area
of architecture to the studies already done and the preliminary
solutions
proposed. My lunch with Emanuel was a step in the right direction.
A long
lunch with the magnificent estuary stretching before us. The
Cagean
candour of his talk made me understand that the project would
have to be
fed by a clear tension between absolute utopia and political
strategy. Or,
if you like, between architecture, city and land planning archetypes
and
specific projects, persistent designs and games of the possible.
Between
luminary visions and decisive gestures. That's it!
I wanted Emanuel to
think of a floating super-structure that would drift
dreamily between the Tagus and the Atlantic, with thousands of
people,
dogs, cats and waxbills on board, going about their lives working,
talking, having fun and being in love. A kind of new Noah's Ark,
the
genetic code of which had been symbiotically designed by Buckminster
Fuller and Emanuel Dimas de Melo Pimenta. Later on, others could
then
attend to studying the physical and logistical sustainability
of the
phenomenon (LNETI, IST, INESC). The architects would return later
to look
at this new genetic model, designing its virtual configurations.
Lastly,
the ideologues would think of the respective contents. And it
would
proceed. When the Olympic Games finally get under way in Lisbon
in 2020 on
the new floating district this would not only be the most unique
feature
of the event but also of the wider ranging fundamental project
in progress
in the Great Estuary.
The afternoon bathed
the smooth current of the river with bright, hot
light. We stopped drinking whisky and put out our cigars. We
promised to
take up the matter again in a few days' time. That is how "AMORES"
(Loves), Emanuel's archetype for "O Grande Estuário"
was born. Welcome!
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