AMORES
uma ilha flutuante para lisboa
emanuel dimas de melo pimenta
o grande estuário
lisboa | 2005
galeria de arte contemporânea quadrum
novembro | 30 | 2005 | 18:30
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Um falanstério no abismo
António Cerveira Pinto
Comecei O Grande Estuário
em 2004, contando com a colaboração estreita do
arquitecto Carlos Sant'Ana. A 15 de Janeiro de 2005 exibiram-se
os
primeiros resultados. A 29 de Abril do mesmo ano, e na mesma
galeria de
arte, a Quadrum, divulgaram-se um conjunto de ideias e propostas
para uma
Lisboa depois da era petrolífera, tendo como horizonte
temporal o ano de
2020. Transformar a região de Lisboa e vale do Tejo num
santuário
ecotecnológico, e Lisboa numa grande biocidade, estendendo-se
pelas duas
margens do estuário; expandir o centro de Lisboa para
a margem Sul do rio;
promover a candidatura da grande área metropolitana aos
Jogos Olímpicos de
2020; preparar a região para a decadência e abandono
dos subúrbios urbanos
ao longo dos próximos 20-30 anos; enfim, recuperar as
cinturas verdes
atacadas pelas devastações industrial e suburbana
dos últimos 50 anos,
foram, até agora, os pontos principais de aplicação
de uma estratégia cujo
objectivo é futurar a própria sobrevivência
deste grande assentamento
urbano no contexto extremamente adverso da extinção
acelerada das reservas
mundiais de petróleo e de gás natural.
O relatório de Robert L. Hirsch, Roger Bezdek e Robert
Wending, Peaking of
World Oil Production: Impacts, Mitigation, & Risk Management,
de Fevereiro
de 2005, encomendado pelo National Energy Technology Laboratory,
organismo
dependente do U.S. Department of Energy, merece ser citado no
contexto
desta apresentação. O coordenador do estudo esteve
em Lisboa no passado
mês de Maio, na Conferência sobre o Pico da Produção
Petrolífera,
promovida pela A.S.P.O., onde apresentou algumas das conclusões
deste
muito procurado Relatório Hirsch. Não deixa de
ser curioso verificar como
a escassa repercussão da Conferência nos nossos
meios de comunicação
social se assemelha ao ostracismo a que o Hirsch Report tem sido
votado
pelos media norte-americanos. De facto, a previsão sobre
os efeitos
catastróficos da crise energética na economia e
segurança mundiais num
horizonte que não ultrapassa o ano de 2025 coincide, ainda
que apenas no
domínio restrito das energias fósseis, com os quadros
previsionais mais
amplos de Limits to Growth (The 30-Year Update), de Donella Meadows,
Jorgen Randers e Dennis Meadows. A civilização
humana pode muito bem ter
entrado já em pleno "overshoot".
Vale a pena ler a
Introdução do "Relatório Hirsch".
The peaking of world oil production presents the U.S. and
the world with
an unprecedented risk management problem. As peaking is approached,
liquid
fuel prices and price volatility will increase dramatically,
and, without
timely mitigation, the economic, social, and political costs
will be
unprecedented. Viable mitigation options exist on both the supply
and
demand sides, but to have substantial impact, they must be initiated
more
than a decade in advance of peaking.
In 2003, the world consumed just under 80 million barrels per
day (MM bpd)
of oil. U.S. consumption was almost 20 MM bpd, two-thirds of
which was in
the transportation sector. The U.S. has a fleet of about 210
million
automobiles and light trucks (vans, pick-ups, and SUVs). The
average age
of U.S. automobiles is nine years. Under normal conditions, replacement
of
only half the automobile fleet will require 10-15 years. The
average age
of light trucks is seven years.
Under normal conditions, replacement of one-half of the stock
of light
trucks will require 9-14 years. While significant improvements
in fuel
efficiency are possible in automobiles and light trucks, any
affordable
approach to upgrading will be inherently time-consuming, requiring
more
than a decade to achieve significant overall fuel efficiency
improvement.
Besides further oil exploration, there are commercial options
for
increasing world oil supply and for the production of substitute
liquid
fuels: 1) Improved Oil Recovery (IOR) can marginally increase
production
from existing reservoirs; one of the largest of the IOR opportunities
is
Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), which can help moderate oil production
declines from reservoirs that are past their peak production:
2) Heavy oil
/ oil sands represents a large resource of lower grade oils,
now primarily
produced in Canada and Venezuela; those resources are capable
of
significant production increases;. 3) Coal liquefaction is a
well
established technique for producing clean substitute fuels from
the
world's abundant coal reserves; and finally, 4) Clean substitute
fuels can
be produced from remotely located natural gas, but exploitation
must
compete with the world's growing demand for liquefied natural
gas.
However, world-scale contributions from these options will require
10-20
years of accelerated effort.
Dealing with world oil production peaking will be extremely complex,
involve literally trillions of dollars and require many years
of intense
effort. To explore these complexities, three alternative mitigation
scenarios were analyzed:
Scenario I assumed that action is not initiated until peaking
occurs.
Scenario II assumed that action is initiated 10 years before
peaking.
Scenario III assumed action is initiated 20 years before peaking.
?For this analysis estimates of the possible contributions of
each
mitigation option were developed, based on an assumed crash program
rate
of implementation.
Our approach was simplified in order to provide transparency
and promote
understanding. Our estimates are approximate, but the mitigation
envelope
that results is believed to be directionally indicative of the
realities
of such an enormous undertaking. The inescapable conclusion is
that more
than a decade will be required for the collective contributions
to produce
results that significantly impact world supply and demand for
liquid
fuels.
Important observations and conclusions from this study are as
follows:
1. When world oil peaking will occur is not known with certainty.
A
fundamental problem in predicting oil peaking is the poor quality
of and
possible political biases in world oil reserves data. Some experts
believe
peaking may occur soon. This study indicates that "soon"
is within 20
years.
2. The problems associated with world oil production peaking
will not be
temporary, and past "energy crisis" experience will
provide relatively
little guidance. The challenge of oil peaking deserves immediate,
serious
attention, if risks are to be fully understood and mitigation
begun on a
timely basis.
3. Oil peaking will create a severe liquid fuels problem for
the
transportation sector, not an "energy crisis" in the
usual sense that term
has been used.
4. Peaking will result in dramatically higher oil prices, which
will cause
protracted economic hardship in the United States and the world.
However,
the problems are not insoluble. Timely, aggressive mitigation
initiatives
addressing both the supply and the demand sides of the issue
will be
required.
5. In the developed nations, the problems will be especially
serious. In
the developing nations peaking problems have the potential to
be much
worse.
6. Mitigation will require a minimum of a decade of intense,
expensive
effort, because the scale of liquid fuels mitigation is inherently
extremely large.
7. While greater end-use efficiency is essential, increased efficiency
alone will be neither sufficient nor timely enough to solve the
problem.
Production of large amounts of substitute liquid fuels will be
required. A
number of commercial or near-commercial substitute fuel production
technologies are currently available for deployment, so the production
of
vast amounts of substitute liquid fuels is feasible with existing
technology.
8. Intervention by governments will be required, because the
economic and
social implications of oil peaking would otherwise be chaotic.
The
experiences of the 1970s and 1980s offer important guides as
to government
actions that are desirable and those that are undesirable, but
the process
will not be easy.
Mitigating the peaking of world conventional oil production presents
a
classic risk management problem:
Mitigation initiated earlier than required may turn out to be
premature,
if peaking is long delayed.
If peaking is imminent, failure to initiate timely mitigation
could be
extremely damaging.
Prudent risk management requires the planning and implementation
of
mitigation well before peaking. Early mitigation will almost
certainly be
less expensive than delayed mitigation. A unique aspect of the
world oil
peaking problem is that its timing is uncertain, because of inadequate
and
potentially biased reserves data from elsewhere around the world.
In
addition, the onset of peaking may be obscured by the volatile
nature of
oil prices. Since the potential economic impact of peaking is
immense and
the uncertainties relating to all facets of the problem are large,
detailed quantitative studies to address the uncertainties and
to explore
mitigation strategies are a critical need.
The purpose of this analysis was to identify the critical issues
surrounding the occurrence and mitigation of world oil production
peaking.
We simplified many of the complexities in an effort to provide
a
transparent analysis. Nevertheless, our study is neither simple
nor brief.
We recognize that when oil prices escalate dramatically, there
will be
demand and economic impacts that will alter our simplified assumptions.
Consideration of those feedbacks will be a daunting task but
one that
should be undertaken.
Our study required that we make a number of assumptions and estimates.
We
well recognize that in-depth analyses may yield different numbers.
Nevertheless, this analysis clearly demonstrates that the key
to
mitigation of world oil production peaking will be the construction
a
large number of substitute fuel production facilities, coupled
to
significant increases in transportation fuel efficiency. The
time required
to mitigate world oil production peaking is measured on a decade
time-scale. Related production facility size is large and capital
intensive. How and when governments decide to address these challenges
is
yet to be determined.
Our focus on existing commercial and near-commercial mitigation
technologies illustrates that a number of technologies are currently
ready
for immediate and extensive implementation. Our analysis was
not meant to
be limiting. We believe that future research will provide additional
mitigation options, some possibly superior to those we considered.
Indeed,
it would be appropriate to greatly accelerate public and private
oil
peaking mitigation research. However, the reader must recognize
that doing
the research required to bring new technologies to commercial
readiness
takes time under the best of circumstances. Thereafter, more
than a decade
of intense implementation will be required for world scale impact,
because
of the inherently large scale of world oil consumption.
In summary, the problem of the peaking of world conventional
oil
production is unlike any yet faced by modern industrial society.
The
challenges and uncertainties need to be much better understood.
Technologies exist to mitigate the problem. Timely, aggressive
risk
management will be essential.
in http://oge.risco.pt/ftp/Oil_Peaking_NETL.pdf
Veremos no decorrer
de 2006-07 se a volatilidade dos mercados energéticos,
o provável rebentamento da bolha imobiliária mundial,
o número de
catástrodes naturais e pandemias, a fome e novos e mais
surpreendentes
conflitos militares (de que a tensão nuclear no Irão
é um péssimo
prenúncio) darão infelizmente razão a estes
perturbantes cenários. Eu se
fosse o Primeiro-Ministro de Portugal olharia para estes avisos
com a
maior das atenções. Se fosse, buscaria no apoio
do próximo Presidente da
República a aliança necessária à
imposição de um verdadeiro plano de
emergência nos domínios da energia, dos transportes,
do ordenamento do
território, da agricultura e pescas, da segurança
interna e da defesa
nacional... Tudo o resto viria depois, e sobretudo em apoio destas
prioridades.
O panorama não
pode ser mais deprimente. Mas devemos a Donella Meadows
(pioneira na identificação deste problema) o esforço
de encarar este
futuro incerto com uma estratégia positiva. Segundo a
co-autora de Limits
to Growth (1972, 2004) e de Beyond The Limits (1992) precisamos
de fazer
uma nova revolução, a Revolução da
Sustentabilidade. E para tal, nada
melhor do que seguir algumas normas de conduta estratégica:
Visionar
(Visioning), Operar em Rede (Networking), Dizer a verdade (Truth-Telling),
Aprender (Learning) e Amar (Loving). Se formos capazes de passar
esta
mensagem e aplicá-la, desde já, ao território
onde habitamos, trabalhamos
e vivemos, estaremos a prestar um bom serviço a nós
mesmos e à inadiável
Revolução da Sustentabilidade. O nome desta revolução,
em Lisboa, é O
Grande Estuário!
Para alimentar o imaginário desta caminhada forçada
contra o caos, intuí
uma imagem simbólica: construir um falanstério
no abismo. Precisava tão só
de um ícone que a representasse. É neste preciso
ponto que entram Emanuel
Dimas de Melo Pimenta e as suas proto-estruturas arquitectónico-musicais,
devedoras de um link fundamental e muito oportuno às utopias
estéticas de
Richard Buckminster Fuller e de John Cage.
A arquitectura generativa e biológica avant la lettre
de Bucky Fuller faz
todo o sentido nesta fase d'O Grande Estuário, na medida
em que devemos
evitar algumas armadilhas do pragmatismo, mas também na
medida em que
precisamos de encontrar um sistema de módulos generativos
que permitam
deixar nascer e dar corpo bio-cibernético aos nossos esquemas
intelectuais
mais ou menos apriorísticos. Faria sentido encontrar um
contraponto
especulativo, na área da arquitectura, aos estudos já
realizados e às
soluções preliminares propostas. O almoço
com o Emanuel foi o passo dado
na direcção certa. Um longo almoço diante
do magnífico estuário. A candura
cageana do seu discurso fez-me perceber que o projecto teria
que
alimentar-se de uma tensão clara entre a utopia absoluta
e a estratégia
política. Ou se quiserem, entre arquétipos de arquitectura,
de cidade e de
território, e projectos concretos, desenhos insistentes,
jogos de
possibilidades. Entre visões lumínicas e gestos
decisivos. É isso!
Eu queria que o Emanuel pensasse numa super-estrutura flutuante,
que
pudesse vaguear sonhando entre o Tejo e o Atlântico, com
milhares de
pessoas, cães, gatos e bicos de lacre a bordo, nas suas
vidas de trabalho,
conversa, diversão e amor. Uma espécie de nova
Arca de Noé, cujo código
genético tivesse sido simbioticamente desenhado por Buckminster
Fuller e
Emanuel Dimas de Melo Pimenta. Outros depois poderiam encarregar-se
de
estudar a sustentação física e logística
do fenómeno (o LNETI, o IST, o
INESC). Os arquitectos voltariam mais tarde a olhar para este
novelo
genético, desenhando as suas configurações
virtuais. Os ideólogos
pensariam, mais finamente, nos respectivos conteúdos.
E por aí adiante.
Quando os Jogos Olímpicos abrissem finalmente as suas
portas em Lisboa, no
ano de 2020, no novo bairro flutuante seria o grande ex-libris
não apenas
do evento, mas também do projecto mais amplo e fundamental
em curso no
Grande Estuário.
A tarde banhou de uma luz brilhante e quente a corrente suave
do rio.
Parámos de beber whisky e apagámos os charutos.
Prometemo-nos voltar ao
assunto dentro de dias. Assim nasceu AMORES, o arquétipo
do Emanuel para o
Grande Estuário. Bem-vindo!
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